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ABSTRACT
Based on extensive new empirical fieldwork (via a case study of the reform
of the territorial State in 2007–2010), this article interrogates the meaning of
the prefectoral institution in France. The central puzzle this article addresses
is the survival of a pre-democratic institution – the Prefect in – a democratic,
decentralizing and Europeanised Republic. Changing conditions have required
institutional resilience and adaptation in a period of state restructuring and
rescaling. The case study of the prefectures as old institutions is framed using
language and tools of new institutionalism across three dimensions: the timing
and sequence of decision-making, the logic of appropriateness, and interaction.
Beyond the narrow case of the prefectures in France, the article makes the case
for combining modes of institutionalist analysis in order to penetrate generalities
about the black box of institutions.
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The central puzzle of this article is the survival of a 200 year old institution –
the prefect – in the context of a democratic, decentralizing and Europeanised
French Republic. The key justification for the institution has shifted over
time. Far from the quasi-military logic inherent in the Napoleonic model,
France’s contemporary prefects have justified their existence through notions
related to the horizontal coordination of the State, partnership with local
and regional authorities and orchestration of France’s interactions with the
European Union in the field of regional policy. Insofar as the State still seeks
a presence throughout France, however, it is physically embodied in the
figure of the prefect, who can claim to represent the symbolic institutional
continuity of the State. The article does not seek to offer an exhaustive
history of the prefectoral institution (see for example Tanguy 2009; Le Lidec
2007; Kerrouche 1997; Gre´mion 1976; Worms 1966; and for a small number
of works in English that have stood the test of time see Chapman 1955;
Machin 1976), but rather looks at fresh empirical evidence drawn mainly
(though not entirely) from the 2007–2010 period of far-reaching political and
administrative reform.
This case study is designed to allow more general lessons to be drawn about
the variable contexts and forms of multi-level governance in Europe (Piattoni
2010). Contemporary France lies in the shrinking camp of unitary decentralised
states (Pinson 2010; Pasquier 2009; Le Gale`s 2008; Thoenig 2005; Delcamp
and Loughlin 2002) French regions lack the law-making powers of counterparts
in Germany, Spain, Italy or the devolved governments in the UK. But our
study demonstrates that outcomes can and do vary according to territorial
configurations. The processes described in the first part of the article validate
arguments based on a modified version of multi-level governance, understood
in terms of Piatonni’s three axes of internal decentralisation, domestic-
international pressures and reconfigured state-society relations (Piattoni 2010).
The main challenges to this modified version of multi-level governance are
discussed in part two, which explores the use of managerial and fiscal policy
instruments of the type that have a more general resonance across Europe.
Against the general background of multi-level governance, the article
addresses the core research question of the conditions for institutional
resilience and adaptation in a period of state restructuring and rescaling,
where resilience is defined in terms of long-term organisational survival and
adaptability is framed as adjusting to new roles. To make sense of the
prefectures as institutions, we combine empirical observation with the
insights of new institutionalism, a broad body of theory that facilitates an
understanding of the varied facets of the prefectures as organizations. For
the purposes of analytical clarity, we identify three distinctive dimensions in
the new institutionalist literature that encompass the values and interests of
actors (appropriateness or sense-making), the temporalities of institutional
design (decision-making) and the interdependent relationships that, in
practice, constrain the operation of institutions (interactions).
Networked Institutionalism and the evolution of a territorial public space
The three dimensions of sense-making, decision-making and interaction
respond to key roles that are performed in the prefectures. In this section,
we present the French prefectures mainly in terms of their interactions
beyond the State, concentrating on the development of a territorial public
space from the early 1980s. The approach we label as networked institutionalism
insists upon formal and informal modes of institutionalization of inter-
organisational dynamics (Cole and John 2001; Peters 1999). The next
section offers a more detailed analysis of the 2007–2010 reform from the
prism of models of decision-making and norms of appropriate behaviour.
The Temporal Dimension
Reasoning in terms of the temporalities of institutional design requires a
fine-grained understanding of historical settings. From the perspective of
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the historical longue dure´e, the core legitimacy of the prefect has been derived
from representing the French State in its territories, rather than symbo-
lizing a particular regime. Though the prefect came to embody a certain
conception of the Republic, the origins of the institution lie in the imperial
Napoleonic regime, and prefects have served the state under Republics,
Empires and the wartime Vichy regime as well (Pontier 2010). The prefect
was created by Napoleon in 1800 to represent the State in each of the then
90 de´partements in metropolitan France. In the Revolutionary-Napoleonic
tradition, the role of the locality was, as Hayward (1983) put it, to integrate
the periphery in a centralized system. The (departmental) prefect was, in
theory, the pivot of this system of territorial administration. He represented
the central state in French localities and was charged with controlling local
communes, implementing central government policies and maintaining
public order. If the apogee of the prefectoral institution was during the
Second Empire (1852–1870), the institution had to adapt to the slow con-
solidation of French local democracy with the 1871 (departmental) and 1884
(municipal) Acts (Mabileau 1991). In his detailed study, Machin (1976)
contrasted the myth of an omnipresent state official with the reality of a
politically emasculated and subordinate ‘parliamentary’ prefect in the third
and fourth Republics. For most of the past two centuries, central govern-
ment did not want the prefects to become too powerful, because they might
recreate the powerful baronies of the ancien regime. Prefects were encouraged
to refer up to Paris for even minor administrative decisions, in practice
reducing their capacity to exercise territorial leadership. Herein lies the
essential ambivalence of the prefectoral institution, whose capacity for
action has ultimately rested as much upon territorialized relationships as on
formal roles and rules.
A rather different perspective on the historical longue dure´e concerns
the contextually rich accounts of local politico-administrative relations
provided by organizational sociologists, writing in the 1960s and 1970s but
referring mainly to the pre-1940 period. The ‘cross-regulation’ approach
developed by Crozier and Thoenig (1975) provided the fullest account of
relations between local political and administrative actors. There was an
ongoing interaction between state officials (notably the prefect) and leading
local politicians, confirming that the State was unable to exercise a genuine
territorial control without the support of the political barons known as
notables. Relationships were limited to a ‘dual elite’ of political and
administrative actors; there was no place for ‘third parties, whether they be
economic interests or voluntary associations’ (Duran and Thoenig 1996:
588). There was an incentive for ambitious politicians to accumulate
elective offices (cumul des mandats) as office gave access to higher levels of
authority and consolidated local power bases. A similar framing of informal
institutionalization was that of ‘tamed Jacobinism’ (Gre´mion 1976),
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whereby prefects and notables struck compromises to adapt national policy
to local circumstances. Underpinning these accounts is the observation that
prefects have always had to accommodate local political forces. The
metaphor of cross regulation left a powerful legacy in the study of French
inter-governmental relations, and still today is used as shorthand to refer to
such pervasive practices as multiple office holding (cumul des mandats), the
tradition of appealing to higher placed levels of authority for arbitration,
and the dynamic of cooperation and competition between territorial political
and administrative elites.
Two parallel, yet distinctive processes occurred in the first decade after
1958; the promotion of a coordinating role for the departmental prefect
over field services in the de´partement and the emergence of a regional level as
a space for public policy (Machin 1976). Ultimately, the latter was of more
significance. The modernizing postwar state looked to the regional space,
not the de´partements, to provide the institutional basis for regional economic
planning (Burnham 2009). The regional prefectures (created in 1964) were
at the heart of this regionalisation strategy. Functional regionalisation
helped to define the regional space in terms of an economic, rather than a
political space, and a policy making space, rather than a ‘normative’ one
(Pasquier 2010). But at least it laid the bases for the later development of a
regional public sphere. Initially limited in their scope, the regional prefectures
have developed key resources since the early 1980s as a result of the (separate
but linked) processes of political and administrative decentralisation, state-
regional planning and the implementation of EU regional policy, three
dimensions of negotiated interactions that we now consider.
Decentralisation
The post-1982 period provided the context for adapting and rescaling
the outmoded ‘cross regulation’ model to a form of multi-level governance.
The complex political decentralization reforms of 1982 eventually aligned
France with the core principles of the Council of Europe’s European
Charter of Local Autonomy that she finally signed in 2007 (Schondorf-
Haubold 2007). Political decentralization took the form of the creation of 22
elected regional councils, with what were initially perceived to be rudimentary
powers. The 1982 law also greatly enhanced the decision-making powers of
the 96 departmental councils (created by the Revolution) and of the larger
communes. A constitutional amendment of 2003 declared that France was
henceforth a ‘decentralised Republic’ and embedded further the legal and
financial rights and responsibilities of local and regional authorities. In
practice, the various sub-national authorities have overlapping territorial
jurisdictions and loosely defined spheres of competence. Moreover, there is no
formal hierarchy among them. Unlike in federal systems, the French regions
388 Cole
do not exercise leadership over other local authorities; if anything, the French
regions are dependent upon the co-operation of lower-level authorities – the
departments in particular – for the successful implementation of their own
policies.
Constitutional provisions provide strict boundaries within which the
regional public sphere has developed1. By creating directly elected regional
councils, however, the decentralization reforms of the early 1980s added a
significant player, whose influence should neither be overstated nor
underplayed. The Regions soon proved themselves determined to develop
their policy capacity and expertise as part of a broader process of institution
building (Nay 1997). From the early years of the French regions, empirical
studies have uncovered institutionalized forms of interdependent relation-
ships in areas as diverse as education (Dupuy 2010), higher education (Aust
and Crespy 2009), employment and training (Berthet 2010), transport
(Barone 2008), regional languages (Harguinde´guy and Cole 2009) and
others. Regional institutions established themselves first through investing
in public policy delivery and demonstrating that they were viable partners
of the State.
What we label as a ‘networked institutionalist’ approach emphasizes in
part the adaptation of the public action registers and traditions of cooperation
to new political and institutional circumstances and scales, particularly as a
result of decentralization reforms of the early 1980s and the development of a
more Europeanised policy space. The networked institutionalist approach
rests above all on the argument that the analytically distinct processes of
administrative and political decentralization have facilitated the emergence
of a regional public sphere, by which is signified an arena within which a
plurality of organisations interact: namely local and regional authorities,
regional prefectures, representatives of the EU Commission, ministerial
field services, associations organised on a regional basis, firms and sometimes
social partners (Pasquier 2010; Dupuy 2010; Barone 2008).
The core dimensions of the reemergence of a regional public sphere are:
first, the institutional and policy ambitions of the regional councils; second,
the creation of new forms of resource interdependency as a by-product of
the gradual empowering of the regional councils in areas such as education,
training and transport; and third the processes of rescaling whereby the
policy space has become more complex and multi-layered. The players
involved in inter-organisational networks extend well beyond the former
‘dual elite’ of politicians and civil servants and they interact at different and
variable scales. The rescaling dimension is important, insofar as the key
policy relationships referred to above (in higher and secondary education,
training, transport, EU regional policy, even health) occur at the urban or
regional, rather than departmental levels. In addition to these new
dimensions, we uncover evidence of the creation of robust informal networks
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between regional prefects and the presidents of regional councils, the ‘new’
notables, though by definition these relationships are variable across the
country. In sum, our observation of interactions between regional prefectures,
regional councils and non-state actors lends qualified support to a French
version of multi-level governance.
State-Region Planning
Networked institutionalism is formally based mainly on the linked but
separate processes of the State-Region plans and EU planning. State-
Region planning has its origins in the 1982 decentralisation law (Gaudin
1999). Under the terms of the 1982 law, the regional council first draws up a
regional plan and then negotiates with the State-in-Region, represented by
the regional prefecture. Henceforth, a proportion of the regional councils’
budgets, ranging from 15–25 per cent, is devoted to items co-financed by
the regions, the state and the EU. The mode of financing the State-Region
plans, and of selecting projects, derives in part from a logic of central
steering, the 2007–2013 contracts in particular being closely guided from
the centre (Lerousseau 2008). State-Region plans could never, however, be
reduced to crude central steering. Existing studies demonstrate a variety of
situations across French regions (Kada and Muller-Quoy 2011; Pasquier 2010;
Nay 1997), but the basic rule is one of interdependency of state and region; if
the State retains the key technical expertise, the regions have the budgets.
Evidence gathered in 1995 and 2001 revealed that regions could refuse to agree
to the State’s demands, or put pressure on the State to contractualise in areas it
had not envisaged.2 All actors involved are under pressure to agree the State-
Region plans because agreement opens up the prospect of match funding from
EU structural funds. Moreover, the process itself encourages the regional
state and the elected regions to support each other’s claims for territorial
ascendancy; in the negotiations for the 2007–2013 projects, the regional
prefects negotiated with the regions only, rather than contractualising with
departments or inter-communal bodies (Pontier 2007).
The European funding dimension
The process of negotiating EU structural funds has also strengthened
networked institutionalism. The rules of EU structural funds institutionalise
the regional State-Region partnership. From 1988 onwards, traditional
methods of encouraging spatial developments were adapted to fit the EU’s
funding rules (based on partnership, concentration and additionality, see
Smith 1995). In particular, the pluri-annual planning of development
objectives and funding mechanisms usually led to more detailed negotia-
tions between the different public authorities and social actors (associations,
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chambers of commerce) involved. New relationships between local actors,
the state administration and representatives of the Commission had to be
forged in each region (Pasquier 2009). In practice, negotiating and imple-
menting EU cohesion funds necessarily introduces a degree of autonomy
from Paris. At the project selection phase, core negotiations are carried out
in meetings between regional prefectures, the regional councils and repre-
sentatives of the European Commission. As the SGAR in Nord-Pas-de-Calais
pointed out, in an interview in 1994, the precise details of the negotiations took
place between the regional State, the regional council and representatives
of the Commission (though a representative of the central agency, then the
DATAR, was always present in all meetings and any ‘multi-level’ agreements
had to be approved by Paris).3
In comparative terms, France retains a state-centric mode of managing
structural funds, in which the regional prefectures remain officially the
managing authorities. On the ground, the situation is rather more nuanced
than this. The Regions and the regional prefectures usually co-chair the
Programme Monitoring Committees that determine the selection and
evaluation of grants. In the 2007–2013 round, moreover, French regions
were able to obtain the direct management of 30 to 50 per cent of the
ERDF funds on their territory through the block grant (‘subvention globale’)
procedure (Pasquier 2009). Available evidence suggests contrasting patterns
in different French regions. In Alsace, management of structural funds
was completely devolved to the regional council, as part of the 2003
experimental transfer of powers procedure. In Brittany, the SGAR and the
Regional Council have co-managed EU regional policy in a way that is
largely consensual (Smith 1995). In Ile-de-France, on the other hand, the
Regional Council is not a major player, and the SGAR consults mainly
with the mayors of large cities and the other prefectures (Pasquier 2010).
Informal Institutions
Understanding informal institutions, finally, is required to make full
sense of regional diversity. In the case of Brittany, a long tradition of
collaboration between State and regional elites goes back to the early
postwar period and remains present in the discourse of actors. In this
region, existing registers are adapted to deal with new challenges. The
Brittany regional prefect admitted, in 2010, that ‘I usually have dinner with
President Le Drian once a month or so, along with the SGAR and the
General Director of the regional council’. The ‘network’ identifies priorities
that go beyond the traditional staple of the state-region plans. In the case of
Brittany, the regional State and the regional council claimed to be coop-
erating on energy policy, specifically on wind turbines and solar power. The
prefect and the president of the regional council had been working for
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‘months’ on a Breton energy programme, with the electricity provider
EDF.4 This account is striking in that it identifies modes of informal
interaction that underplay the importance of partisan attachments (the
Socialist President of the Brittany regional council cooperating with the
UMP-designated regional prefect).
Countervailing Pressures
There has not been a clear linear progression in the development of a
regional territorial space. In some regions (e.g. Brittany, Nord-Pas-de-
Calais, Alsace, Poitou-Charentes, Corsica, Rhone-Alpes) it has been more
marked than in others. The variability is in part explained by spatial differ-
ences; in small regions where there are only two departments (for example
Basse-Normandie or Limousin), the departmental level carries more weight
than in larger regions, such as Rhoˆne-Alpes, where there are up to eight
departments. Political and functional dynamics have also affected the devel-
opment of regions. Politically, regionalization has been in retreat since the left’s
clean-sweep in the 2004 regional election and the reaction of the Gaullist-led
(UMP) governments in two recent ‘decentralisation’ Acts of 2004 and 2010.
In the law of 13th August 2004, the regions were certainly strengthened in
matters deemed to be strategic: economic development, education, training,
transport and some health. But major service delivery responsibilities were also
transferred to the departments, which took over most roads and increased their
responsibilities in social welfare, income support and intermediate education.
This ‘victory’ of the departments could in part be explained by political
choices, the departmental level being less dominated by the left. But the main
argument is an institutional one based, to borrow the language of historical
institutionalism, on path dependent change. The previous 1982 reforms had
created a much more sophisticated administrative infrastructure for the
departments than for the new regional councils; the departments had more
capacity, as tested service delivery organizations with large staffs and budgets,
than the regions, a functional concern which weighed heavily in the decision to
transfer new responsibilities to them.
Neverthless, even though the countervailing pressures have been
substantial, they do not undermine the central features of the developing
networked institutionalism as outlined above. Moreover, how relationships
between levels play themselves out is in part behavioural, contingent on the
specific professional, political and functional dynamics in different spaces.
From the above survey, it emerges clearly that the regionalization of public
policy stakes provides one important dimension of the politico-administrative
interactions. But ultimately, as prefects derive their legitimacy from the
state, their margins are bounded. The next section brings the analysis
squarely back to interactions within the French State.
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State Productivity and Implementation: the Reform of the Territorial State,
2007–2010
Through close observation of the regional prefectures in particular, the article
has thus far engaged with the uneven emergence of the regions as spaces
for public policy. This ought not, however, to imply uncritical support for
new forms of territorial regulation. The reform of the territorial State under
Sarkozy (2007–2010), the object of this section, was above all concerned with
empowering the regional level of the state, without much reference to broader
territorial networks. Indeed, the territorial state reform was not accompanied
by a strengthening of the elected regions in the 2010 local government reform
(Cole 2011). The positive sum qualities of state-regional cooperation had been
called into question, from the perspective of President Sarkozy, by the left’s
victory in the 2004 and 2010 regional elections. In the context of a sharper
political division between left and right, why strengthen the regions, and
thereby multiply potential veto players?
The 2007–10 Reforms
In July 2007, François Fillon’s Government (2007–) launched a General
Public Policy Review (Re´vision Ge´ne´rale des Politiques Publiques – RGPP) and
included change in the territorial state (Re´forme de l’Administration territoriale
de l’Etat – Re´ATE) as part of this overarching reform. In its first report
of December 2007, the Policy Review’s Modernisation Council declared
that the State organizes itself first and foremost on a regional basis (Prime
minister 2008a). By merging existing bureaux, reducing the number of
regional field services from around thirty to seven (eight including the
new Regional Health Agencies), and placing them under the hierarchical
authority of the prefect, the state claimed henceforth to adopt a more
‘strategic’ view and to bring the territorial state into line with the mergers
taking place at the central, core executive level (Prime Minister 2008a). The
second level concerned by the Re´ATE was that of the 96 departments in
mainland France (JO 2008 2009a). From being the ‘normal’ level of the
state’s territorial administration, the departmental level was described in a
circular of 2008 as a level of local service delivery and implementation of
central and regional orientations (Prime Minister 2008b). The reforms
redefined the departments around four key elements: the prefecture, the
new interministerial divisions (directions de´partmentales interministerielles – DDI),
the ‘territorial units’ of regional divisions and the new agencies (Kamel
2009). These changes are described in Table 1.
The year 2010 provided a unique opportunity to undertake field work
designed to capture contrasting perceptions of the reform at its main levels of
operation, perception being central to all versions of new institutionalism.
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While acknowledging that we must exercise caution before attributing long-
lasting consequences to such recent changes, we would expect officials in
the prefectures to adapt to the new structures over time.
Respondents for interviews in various relevant bureaux at central gov-
ernment level in 2010, as well as sustained analysis in the French region
of Brittany, were chosen mainly in order to capture temporal evolution
with earlier fieldwork in 1995 and 20015. Simultaneously, a survey of all
TABLE 1. The territorial state in metropolitan France
Nomenclature Functions and services
Regional Level
Regional Prefectures and
General Offices for Regional
The ‘authority’ of regional over departmental prefects is recognized
in the decree of 16 February 2010.
Affairs (SGAR) The regional level is the normal level of the State’s activity and is
formally coordinated by the Regional Administrative Committee
chaired by the regional prefect
The SGAR obtain new budgetary, management and IT
responsibilities and can henceforth recruit their own staff
Seven streamlined regional
services and one new
regional agency
Food, agriculture and forests (DRAAF); Cultural Affairs (DRAC);
Environment, planning and housing (DREAL); Firms,
competition, consumers, work, employment and training
(DiRECCTE); Youth, sports and social cohesion (DRJSCS); Education
(Rectorat); Finance (DRFiP); Regional Health Agencies (ARS)
Departmental level
Prefectures Security, elections, legal control, responsibilities not assumed by the
other departmental divisions. Henceforth control over the Police
and Gendarmerie
Interministerial directorates
for Territory (DDI)
The Interministerial directorates for Territory are merged services
dealing with infrastructure, agriculture, forests and the
environment (DDT)
The Interministerial directorates for Social cohesion and the
protection of populations (DDCSPP) are merged services dealing
with competition, consumer protection, anti-fraud protection and
vetinary services.
In large departments, there are generally separate offices for Social
Cohesion (DDCS) and Protection of the Population (DDPP)
Education The 96 Academic Inspectors and their services retain control over
primary and some secondary education
Finances (DDFiP) The departmental office of the Finance Ministry
The Territorial Units of the
regional field services: ARS,
Henceforth under operational control of the departmental prefects,
subject to decisions in the Regional Administrative Committee
DRAC, DiRECCTE
Source ‘L’avancement de la re´forme de l’administration territoriale
de l’E´tat’, Re´vision Ge´ne´rale des Politiques Publiques, 12 mai 2009
(http://www.rgpp.modernisation.gouv.fr), ‘Quatrie`me Conseil de
Modernisation des Politiques Publiques’ June 2010, RGPP: Paris.
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departmental and regional prefectures was carried out from January to
June 2010 by a working group of the Groupement de Recherche sur
l’Administration Locale en Europe (Research Group on Public Manage-
ment in Local Authorities in Europe, GRALE) (Kada and Muller-Quoy
2011; Muller-Quoy 2010)6. The analysis thus drills down from central
via regional to departmental level. It captures the perceptions of state
officials working at the level of senior management in the prefectures and
new interministerial directorates. In the GRALE survey, the prefectures
of all 96 departments and 22 regions of mainland France were targeted
via a postal questionnaire, complemented in places with follow-up
interviews. The response rate was limited for the regions, as only six out of
22 returned questionnaires (Haute Normandie, Rhoˆne-Alpes, Franche-comte´,
Provence-Alpes-Cotes d’Azur, Centre and Picardie) but 47, nearly half of the
departments, responded. The weighting of the survey in favour of the senior
managers in departmental prefectures allowed a pure ‘prefecture’ perspective
to emerge, counter-balanced somewhat by the interviews at regional and
central government levels.
We will now consider the reform of the territorial state from 2007 to
2010 from our three perspectives of decision-making, sense-making and
interactions, thereby engaging fully with the varied, and sometimes con-
tradictory facets of the prefectures as organizations.
Decision Making
The first entry point for understanding the Re´ATE is that of decision-
making, and specifically short-term institutional design. The institutional
design school, associated particularly with rational choice institutionalism,
believes in the virtues of synoptic reform, involving a clear association of
causes and effects, the most efficient choice of policy instruments to guide
behaviour and providing clear incentive structures to ensure conformity
(Peters 1999; John 1998; Goodin 1995). The reorganization of the regional and
departmental levels of the French state machinery was presented as a product
of a synoptic institutional design, conceived in order to limit capture by
interest groups and reduce the number of veto points within the adminis-
tration. It was driven by an overarching narrative of state productivity closely
associated with President Sarkozy, and with the chief of his presidential office,
Claude Gue´ant, himself a member of the prefectoral corps.
Strengthening the regional level was trailed as the main object of the
2010 reform (JO 2010). The regional level is now the ‘normal’ level of
activity of the state. The departmental level is confirmed in its traditional
functions of law and order and immigration, but all other policy fields
(whether implemented at the departmental and regional level) are placed
under the authority of the regional prefect. For the first time, the decree of
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16th February 2010 affirms that the regional prefect has ‘authority’ over
the departmental prefects. Moreover, using the power of revocation
(‘evocation’), the regional prefect can exercise responsibilities normally
reserved for the departmental prefectures for a limited period of time. Such
a clear affirmation of the ascendancy of the regional over the departmental
level goes much further than any previous moves to strengthen the regional
prefectures. The claim to regional state leadership is strengthened by the
creation of the Regional Administrative Committee (Comite´ d’administration
re´gional – CAR), chaired by the regional prefect. Described by one inter-
locutor as an executive board of the state, the CAR brings together
the directors of the seven new regional services, as well as the head of the
Regional Health Agency and the departmental prefects. Though the
regional prefect has to consult with the CAR in relation to matters such as
human resources policy, the distribution of credits across de´partements, or
performance indicators, she alone is responsible for publishing the State’s
Strategic Action Plan (Plan d’action strate´gique de l’E´tat en region – PASER),
henceforth the key document that serves as a tool to contractualise with the
local authorities.
The regional prefectures are strengthened in their own capacity as
organizations. Moreover, a strong case can be made of the regional level
obtaining the instruments allowing authoritative decisions to be made.
The regional prefectures, created in 1964, were initially light, strategic
bodies that attempted to coordinate the activities of the much weightier
departmental prefectures (Kada 2008). Most service delivery and regulation
was ensured at the departmental level. The key services that the regional
prefects called upon were the General Secretariats for Regional Action
(Secre´tariat ge´ne´ral de l’Action re´gionale – SGAR). For most of their existence,
the SGAR have demonstrated the limits to the regional prefects’ claim to
exercise strategic state leadership. Though they were attached to the
regional prefectures, the SGAR were undermined by tensions brought
about as a result of the corps loyalties of their members.7 The prefect’s
advisors in the SGAR were split between those belonging to the prefectoral
corps and policy experts seconded mainly by the technical corps – Highways
and Bridges notably – who exercised a large degree of autonomy. The
SGARs nonetheless came into their own in the post-decentralisation period,
where they performed a lead role in coordinating State responses in the
six-yearly State-Region planning contracts and, later on, in writing the Single
Programming Documents for the EU cohesion funds. They were strength-
ened greatly by the 2007–2010 reforms. They were transformed into more
substantial administrative structures, for the first time in charge of their own
recruitment. From January 1st 2011, moreover, the SGAR administer a
streamlined budget (BOP 333) that distributes operational credits to the
regional and departmental field services (JO 2009b; Interior Ministry 2010).8
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With their stronger organizational and legal resources, the regional
prefectures’ claim to exercise territorial leadership is one that is apparently
given substance by new instruments of financial monitoring and regulation.
One potential lever to allow the regional prefect to impose his authority is
that of the LOLF (Loi organique relative aux lois de finances), the ‘new’ budgetary
law operational since 2006. Under the LOLF, the regional prefects are
budget holders, formally charged with distributing operational resources to
government agencies and services coming under their hierarchical control.
The regional prefectures control the budget programmes (BOPs, budgets
ope´rationnels de programme) concerned with territorial administration (BOP
307), along with the separate operational budget (BOP 333) administered
by the SGAR (Interior Ministry 2010). Vesting theoretically powerful
institutions with more constraining and precise regulatory instruments is
clearly intended to enhance their substantive, rather than purely procedural,
capacity to coordinate the State’s territorial activities. But the impact of any
particular instrument can not be considered in isolation; the effectiveness of
these new financial controls in particular is curtailed by the role of the Budget
and Public Accounts Ministry considered below.
How were these broad policy objectives received amongst officials in the
prefectures? In the survey and interviews, officials acknowledged the economic
arguments for rationalising the state machinery. Yet most respondents
expressing an opinion were unconvinced that the expressed aims of the reform
would be achieved. Most managers (two-thirds of respondents) believed that
the reform of the territorial State was above all designed to reduce the
number of staff in a zero-sum spiral. Officials in the departmental prefectures
complained about losing resources as a result of regional state centralisation.
They feared shedding jobs to the new DDI, while managers in these new
divisions were anxious about losing their key agents to the new regional
services9. These experiences raised deeper issues of appropriate behaviour that
are now considered.
Making appropriate sense
Our second entry point for understanding the Re´ATE is that of the
logic of sense making. In their seminal book, March and Olsen (1989)
defined institutions in terms of ‘logics of appropriateness’, referring to the
internal cognitive dynamics that bind individuals to organizations and
sustain them. From this perspective, institutions are primarily important
because they embody prevailing ways of understanding the world, which
are closely linked with perceptions of individual self-interest (Schmidt 2010;
Hay 2006; Rouban 2003). March and Olsen (1989) also acknowledged that
logics of consequentiality might come into play – the conscious rational
assessment of costs and benefits and likely consequences of choices. But
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what characterizes an institution is more likely to pertain to perceptions of
norms, the representation of the correct roles that ought to be performed by
officials and rule-bound behaviour.
The prefectoral corps in France is particularly interesting in this respect
(Tanguy 2009). Most prefects form part of a specific corps within the state;
with its own precise identity, sense of appropriate behavior and proud
history, and the prefectoral corps can demonstrate professional continuity
for over two hundred years (see Tanguy 2009; Pontier 2010; Machin 1976).
Yet, in key respects, their collective influence has waned over the past decades.
The prefectoral corps has been divided, as the result of an unresolved tension
between the regional and departmental levels. Most departmental prefects
and sub-prefects opposed the creation of the regional prefectures in 1964,
resisted any hierarchy within the corps and experienced regionalization as a
zero-sum game (Machin 1976). Above all, the prefectures admitted to being
‘traumatised’ by the consequences of decentralization in the early 1980s10
Perceptions of logics of appropriateness thus provide a fruitful angle for
raising important questions about professional dynamics within the prefectures
and the persistence of corps-based identities within the state, as well as the
challenges represented by pressures towards multi-level governance.
Respondents to the GRALE survey addressed questions about professional
cultures, staff duties, or the implementation of the reform that involved
appreciations of appropriate behaviour. At its most elementary, the belief was
widespread that managers in the prefectures ought to conform to central
directives and circulars, perhaps a predictable stance by officials of the Interior
ministry. All departments and regions which responded reported having
applied the national directives and reorganised their services. The adminis-
trative map of France was rationalised and, indeed, made far more uniform
than at any previous stage, particularly at the regional level where there are
now identical services in all regions (except Ile-de-France). Most managers
who expressed an opinion in the open-ended section supported the reform
insofar as it was interpreted as strengthening the visibility of the State and
reducing administrative duplication. There is a suspicion that appropriate
responses were seen as part of appropriate behaviour; most were content to
follow the government and attribute the reform to the economy drive of the
RGPP. This note of methodological caution itself highlights the normative
attachment to the idea of public service and the State as guarantor of the
general will.
Appropriate behaviour suggests a general understanding of roles and
public service. Once the questioning moved down the ladder of abstraction,
more critical comments appeared that were motivated by an understanding
of the ethos and expertise of public service. Though officials declared
themselves favourable to the RGPP, they were strongly opposed to some of
its practical consequences. Evidence from the departmental prefectures
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suggested that there had been very little ‘contracting out’ of key services such
as buildings and vehicle maintenance (though this was envisaged as one
likely outcome of the RGPP).11 Most significantly, the new regional health
agencies were considered, in several responses to open-ended questions, as
an administrative aberration that contradicted the reform’s declared aim to
rationalise and strengthen the prefectures. These perspectives from the field
identified one of the core tensions of the reform; creating independent
agencies while enhancing a rather traditional state steering role.
These tensions spilled over, in face to face interviews, to tensions between
levels. From the perspective of departmental managers, with new powers of
‘evocation’ and budgetary oversight the regional prefect would henceforth be
able to determine the distribution of finances and services between the regional
and departmental levels. There was a fear, from the departments, that the
regional prefects would systematically favour the regional level; that the best
elements would drift to the regional services, and that the DDI would not
have enough agents to fulfil their basic tasks (Direction de´partementale
des Territoires et de la Mer and Ile-et-Vilaine 2010). This rivalry between
levels was moderated, however, by countervailing professional dynamics, the
regional and departmental prefects remaining part of the same corps. In the
22 regional capitals, there is still no separation between the regional and
departmental prefectures, with the regional prefect in practice delegating
the management of departmental affairs to his general secretary. Creating a
collective leadership of the regional state challenges the overarching sense of
corps loyalty, but professional loyalties are mediating the process of territorial
state reform. A cogent example was provided by one regional prefect, who
admitted convening an informal meeting limited to the regional and depart-
mental prefects in the morning that would continue over lunch where subjects
would be ‘freely debated’ before a more formal meeting occurred with the
directors of the regional services in the Regional Administrative Conference
itself (Pre´fecture de Re´gion Bretagne 2010)12.
Another measure of appropriate behaviour related to an agent-centred
preoccupation with roles and grades. The survey and the author’s own
fieldwork in the Ile-et-Vilaine department (Brittany) revealed serious diffi-
culties of cultural adaptation, especially as a result of mergers in the new
interministerial departmental services. Enforced mergers brought together
bureaux which ‘do not share the same administrative culture’ or ways of
working, such as the reorganisation in the new interministerial directorates
for social cohesion and the protection of populations (DDCSPP – Direction
De´partementale de la Cohe´sion Sociale et de la Protection des Populations) that
brought together animal health and sports services within the same struc-
ture (Kada and Muller-Quoy 2011). The main issue, however, was one of
statutes. Though agents were housed in the new structures, they remained
attached to their corps of origin, with specific terms, conditions and rates of
Prefects in Search of a Role in a Europeanised France 399
remuneration depending upon which corps they belong to. Different collec-
tive agreements have governed staff mobility across services. The mixed
commissions (commissions administratives paritaires – CAP), which have to approve
changes of working conditions, operate only at the national ministerial level,
and they vary between ministries. Hence the new DDI have little control over
the terms and conditions of their agents. As a result, though departmental
services were intended to join up services on the basis of broad areas of service
delivery, organisational silos have persisted.
From this account, the reform of the territorial state conflicted with the
traditional role perceptions of agents within the prefectures, who were
fearful of the material and status consequences of what was perceived as the
regionalisation of the territorial state and the creation of unwelcome new
institutional forms such as agencies. The prevailing corps ethos continued
to matter and served to smooth the effects of a net division between regional
and departmental levelsyfor the moment. The evidence presented here
suggests that the prefectoral corps itself has always been divided about
institutional reform, but has lacked the capacity to prevent the clearer
emergence of regional prefects as something akin to a grands corps of senior
civil servants close to those in political authority.
Interactions; from networks to hierarchies
Our third perspective for understanding the Re´ATE is that of inter-
actions. Thus far the analysis has revealed two rather contrasting logics that
correspond to the twin faces of state reform. Networked institutionalism
involved the strengthening of networks between politicians and regional
prefects and – at its strongest – the emergence of a regional public sphere.
Regional prefects performed an ambiguous role, whereby building
resources in alliance with non central state partners facilitated a degree of
autonomy. The reform of the territorial state from 2007–2010 proceeded,
however, from a state productivity logic, involving a primary concern with
the State’s own operation and a NPM-style register based on targets,
verifiable information, performance indicators, and a clearer identification
of centres of decision-making and accountability. An emphasis on state
productivity also implied a challenge to more traditional forms of state-
regional cooperation, demonstrated by the outcomes of the 2010 local
government reform which markedly failed to strengthen the competencies
of the elected regions. While this decoupling of state and territory might
make sense from a central steering perspective, it undermined the claim of
regional prefects to mediate forms of vertical and horizontal coordination.
Far more than producing an easy clarification, the 2007–2010 reforms
revealed deep structural rivalries based on rival claims of coordination
within the French State. There are at least two key obstacles in the way of
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the regional prefect’s horizontal claim to coordinate government activity.
First, the vertical structure of most sectoral activity; government depart-
ments, and ministers in particular, still seek to give orders to their territorial
services. Within the State, the coordinating claims of the prefectures run
against the vertical organisational structure represented by the central
ministries in Paris and their external services. The central ministries now
retain agents and services only at the regional level, their departmental
services having been, to all extents and purposes, dissolved. As the regional
level is now the only level where the Paris-based ministries can directly
intervene, it was suggested in several interviews that the lead ministries were
seeking to exercise a tighter control over their regional services than they
had previously thought necessary.13
Second, more specifically, in relation to the role of the Finance and
Budget and Public Accounts ministries. Relations between prefects and
representatives of the Finance ministry have invariably been poor, as Machin
(1976) demonstrates. The Finance ministry has resisted attempts to enhance
prefectoral coordination. A step change came with the new budgetary law
of 2001 (operational since 2006), the LOLF. Though it did not initiate
this reform (driven by a cross-party alliance of deputies seeking to enhance
parliamentary control over government expenditure), the Finance ministry’s
Budget division (later ministry) was anxious to control its implementation.
One interlocutor in the associated Budgetary Reform division explained in
some detail why central government felt it necessary to exercise a close
supervision over lower levels of the State: ‘the central administration has an
important role to play in ensuring the coherence of public policy, and in
monitoring the budget. We are reluctant to allow the field services too much
autonomy’.14 This distrust spilled over into a resistance to allowing the regional
prefectures full control over decentralized state budgets. Though the LOLF
enhances the regional over the local levels, the bulk of resources distributed via
the regional prefectures are ring-fenced for specific services and government
agencies15. The Budget and Public Accounts ministry has thus made its presence
felt as the core vertical coordinating force, using the budgetary instrument to
confine and control the territorial state (Bezes 2009, DGME 2010).
The vertically focused French state has always placed obstacles in the
way of genuine coordinating powers for the prefectures. Prefectoral claims
have had to face rival modes of state coordination; those based on sectoral
control (ministries and their field services), budgetary instruments (the role
of the Finance ministry), professional identities (the system of competing
and rival corps within the State) and political leadership. Rival modes of
state coordination remain very present and, indeed, they respond to the
core features of the French state itself. Moreover, as in the case of the
LOLF, policy instruments can develop their own path dependent logics
that tie-in future reforms. If the examples above are drawn from empirical
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fieldwork in France, they elucidate more generic cross-national issues of
territorial, fiscal and functional coordination; and especially the centralising
impact of new budgetary policy instruments across (and beyond) states in
the euro-zone.
Discussion
Studying the prefectures gets to the heart of the nature of the contemporary
French state. The article addressed the core research question: what are the
conditions for institutional resilience and adaptation in a period of state
restructuring and rescaling? Our case study of the prefectures as old
institutions was framed using the language and analytical tools of new
institutionalism, specifically across the three dimensions of the temporality
of decision-making, sense-making and interaction.
These three sub-fields each offer partial responses to this core question.
The temporality of decision-making dimension allows distinctions to be
drawn between different timescales; from the longue dure´e of institutional
genesis and evolution to the short-term timescale of a specific reform (the
Re´ATE). Historical institutionalists offer two main types of explanation for
institutional resilience: the path dependent and the evolutionary (Steinmo
2008). Path dependent explanations emphasise how organizations are origin-
ally constituted, in particular the rules they embody and values they represent.
A decision-making variant of path dependency stresses that decisions taken
early on in any process help to define the possibilities for further evolution
(Pierson 2004). Evolutionary explanations borrow analogies from the natural
sciences to explain why certain institutions survive and why others fail.
Survival is a function of adaptation to a changing environment: in the
words of Steinmo (2008: 128) ‘the historical institutionalist is something like
an environmental biologist who believes that in order to understand the
specific fate of a particular organism or behaviour, she must explicitly
examine that organism in the ecology or context in which it lives’.
What purchase do these ideas have for our case? The weight of historical
creation in shaping institutional design is extremely important. The
Napoleonic model that emerged towards the end of the French revolution
required a symbolic homogeneity of French society; this constitutive act
vested the office of the prefect with the enduring values of embodying the
general interest in France’s territories. As the article has demonstrated,
however, reasoning in terms of genetic codes has many limitations, not least
insofar as it underplays the capacity to engage in learning or to survive by
evolution. The decision-making dimension is more central to our case
study. The prefectures classically formed part of a departmental structure
vested with its own path dependent logic. The traditional weight of the
departmental prefectures has been modified by the rise of the elected
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departmental councils as major service delivery agencies, especially since
1982. But, in one reading, political and administrative decentralisation has
been narrowly confined to the traditional departmental circuits which have
emerged stronger from successive reforms (Procureur 2011). These analyses
illuminate the tensions within the prefectoral corps, as well as the existence
of rival territorial networks to those described in terms of the regional
public sphere. The broad historical context is also key to understanding
the dynamics of any specific reform, such as that of 2007–2010, beset by
problems of policy implementation and the unintended consequences of
past decisions. More generally, the weight of history greatly contributes to
understanding how the French State continues to combine rival vertical,
territorial, professional and bureau-shaping logics.
On the other hand, the 2007–2010 reforms represented a step change in
the regionalisation of the state, the apogee of a long evolution in the post-
war period. More precise legal and regulatory instruments strengthened the
capacity of the regional prefectures to coordinate the State’s territorial
activities. In the past decade the prefectures have evolved within the French
State in the context of a discursive shift towards state productivity. These
trends came to a climax in the first Sarkozy presidency of 2007–2012; hence
the attention paid to the reform of the territorial state under Sarkozy and
the extensive reflection on the nature of institutions in a multi-level context.
In practice, we argued that the language of state productivity empowers
other players, renders less credible the discourse of territorial coordination
and embeds budgetary actors as the key coordinators of the State. Rather
paradoxically, the post-2007 environment appeared somewhat less con-
ductive to building the territorial regimes that had emerged in the first two
decades after decentralization in spite of the formal strengthening of the
authority of the regional prefectures. Arguments based on path dependency
are important but do not, in themselves, explain the emergence of the
regions as policy spaces and the role performed by regional prefects therein,
nor, indeed, the managerial turn operated by Sarkozy.
A second partial response to the question of resilience lies in understanding
the policy worlds of actors. Drawing from sociological institutionalism, the
French prefectures can be understood as a professional corps. The corps are
very distinctive groups within the French State, a set of self-regulating elites
that jostle for ascendancy and influence within (and beyond) the state and seek
to preserve their influence against rival (especially lesser ranked) corps. The
evidence presented here suggests that the prefectoral corps has been divided,
as the result of an unresolved tension between the regional and departmental
levels; a varying reaction to decentralization, and a strategically distinct stance
to rescaling by the departmental and regional levels. Though the sense of
corps still provides a veneer of overarching cohesion, our discussion suggests
that the collective influence and identity of the prefectoral corps has waned
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over the past decades. Professional logics within the state, embodied in the
corps, have proved tough to reform. As Gervais (2010) demonstrates, however,
professional identities are not static and do not preclude either evolutionary or
anticipatory behaviours by actors within the state. Arguments based on logics
of appropriateness are necessary, but not sufficient for understanding why
institutions persist.
This conclusion points to a third form of explanation, whereby resi-
lience demonstrates a capacity to adapt to a changing environment. Far
from static representations of roles, beliefs and genetic codes, the prefectures
are best understood in action and interaction. The main contribution made
by this analysis is in terms of interactions, in a process I describe as that of
networked institutionalism and that accommodates the idea of evolution
through interaction. My main argument is that prefects in France have
proved resilient in part because of their strategic positioning as mediators in
the management of political and administrative decentralization, a centrality
that has given rise to forms of networked institutionalism. Through close
observation of the regional prefectures in particular (but not exclusively), the
article has engaged with the emergence of the regions as spaces for public
policy and the engagement of the regional level in processes of territorial state
reform throughout the Fifth Republic. In the post-decentralisation period,
prefectoral authority was revived in the context of an imperfect pattern of
territorial decentralisation, one based on the survival and partial rescaling of
parallel political and administrative filie`res. As territorial policy actors, regional
prefects benefited in particular from the new structure of opportunities
opened by decentralisation, State-Region planning and EU regional policy. In
these fields, at least, decentralisation in France was framed in terms of distinct
but interdependent state and regional spheres – the latter gaining in capacity
insofar as the former increasingly formalised interactions at the regional
(rather than departmental) level. What we describe as networked institu-
tionalism encapsulates the form of cooperation between networks in the
restrictive setting of the French unitary state. It gives substance to arguments
that accept the utility of reasoning in terms of a modified version of multi-level
governance in the French case.
In sum, a 200 year old institution is best understood in through a hybrid
interpretation. The core dimensions are those of the temporalities of
institutional design (both in terms of longue dure´e and in response to specific
reforms), the values and interests of actors (non-constant and variable
according to position within the corps), and the interdependent relation-
ships that, in practice, constrain the operation of institutions. We contend
that logics of decision-making, appropriateness and interaction are rarely
consistent; understanding the prefectures as organisations empirically requires
revealing the tension between these dimensions, as well as demonstrating how
they might be combined. Beyond the narrow case of the prefectures in
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France, the article makes the case for combining modes of institutionalist
analysis in order to penetrate beyond generalities into the black box of real
institutions, which, of necessity, need to be contextualised. Institutional design
(decision-making) has always had to contend with normative and cognitive
reactions based on notions of appropriateness (sense-making) and this case
confirms that the cognitive and normative worlds of managers working in
prefectures provide a very specific context through which rational reform
designs are filtered. Above all, making sense of institutions requires an
understanding of their interactions, and their strategic capacity to adapt to
change (understood both as exogenous and endogenous) and to respond to
evolutionary pressures.
NOTES
1. The constitutional provision ensuring the ‘free administration of local authorities’ (compe´tence ge´ne´rale
d’administration) prevents any hierarchical control of the regions over other levels of sub-national authority.
2. For example in relation to old age people’s homes.
3. Interview in 1994 (SGAR Nord/Pas-de-Calais). ‘The regional prefect is the interlocutor of Brussels
for the regional single programming documents. Negotiations take place directly between the
regional prefect and the Commission. It’s the same thing for the expenditure of the EU grants; the
central State no longer has anything to do with it’.
4. This account is based on information provided by the Brittany regional prefecture.
5. Earlier fieldwork was carried out as part of two separate ESRC projects 2001–2003 ‘Devolution and
Decentralisation in Wales and Brittany’ (Grant no. L219252007) and ‘Local Policy Networks in
Britain and France’ (Grant no L311253047, with Peter John)
6. Groupement de Recherche sur l’Administration locale en Europe, a CNRS-accredited research
institute mainly funded by the French Interior ministry. Surveys were addressed to all regional and
departmental prefectures in mainland France. The overall response rate (53 responses from 118) fell
someway short of 50%. This provides a rich data set with which to complement the case study
analysis undertaken by the author.
7. This theme emerged in interviews in two French regions in 1994–96.
8. But these inter-ministerial bodies remain administrative lightweights; doubts were expressed in
interviews within and beyond the SGAR that they would be able to perform the new functions vested
on them: ‘The SGARs still have little real capacity’. Interview, 2010.
9. ‘Any new jobs are going to the regional level, we are losing jobs’ Interview, 2010.
10. The expression is that of the General-Secretary of an important prefecture interviewed in 1994.
11. Muller-Quoy (2010) reports this finding
12. Interview, 2010.
13. ‘In fact, the regional field services still receive directives from their ministries’ Interview, Ministry of
Finance’s Budget division, 2010.
14. Interview, Budgetary Reform division, Finance ministry 2005.
15. Confirmed in interviews at central and regional level in 2010. This limits the significance of the
principle of fungibility that ought to benefit the regional prefect.
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